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1. Introduction
A safe work environment protects employees from 
unwanted scenarios and increases their determination, 
which would ultimately lead to enhancing productivity, 
efficiency and overall profit for an organization. There 
are many factors which compels for increased production 
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There are many techniques for hazard identification and are divided into 
shortcut, standard and advanced techniques. Among these, HAZOP and 
What-If techniques are mostly engaged by practitioners in the chemical 
process industry. Both of these have certain advantages and limitations, 
i.e., HAZOP is structured, and what-if covers broad range of scenarios. 
There is no hazard identification method, which can cover a broad range 
of scenarios and is structured in nature. For this purpose, a new technique 
namely integrated hazard identification (IHI) is proposed in this article 
that integrates HAZOP and What-If. The methodology is demonstrated via 
hazard identification study of urea synthesis section. Risk ranking is used to 
sort out the worst-case scenario. This worst-case scenario is further studied 
in detail for quantification that is performed using the ALOHA software. 
This quantification has assisted to detect ammonia concentrations in nearby 
control room and surroundings for worst-case scenario. It is revealed that if 
ammonia pump is not stopped within 10 minutes, concentration inside and 
outside the control room may reach to 384 ppm and 2630 ppm, compared 
to 1100 ppm (AEGL-3). Thus the proposed method would be easy, time 
saving and covers more details and would be handy for practicing engineers 
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increased competition among competitors which have 
increased both the complexity of chemical processes and 
resources thus disturbing the balance of resources. For 
these reasons, hazardous chemicals storage, transportation 
and handling have raised many safety concerns. For 
instance, on April 17, 2013, there was a significant 
explosion at a fertilizer warehouse that killed 15 people 
including 12 emergency responders at West Fertilizer 
Company in West, Texas, USA [1]. Likewise, there are 
many other accidents such as Coffeyville Fertilizer Plant 
high-pressure Urea Ammonium Nitrate (UAN) vessel 
rupture in October 2010 [2], Port Neal Fertilizer plant 
explosion in December 1994 [3], Toulouse Fertilizer 
complex accident in September 2001 [4] and Texas City 
Disaster in April 1947 [4]. As all these accidents have been 
reported in fertilizers sectors, therefore, special attention 
seems necessary to be given to fertilizer plants for safe 
and uninterrupted operation.
Risk science is a key to enhance safety culture [5,6]. 
The post-accident investigation was analyzed by U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) 
for 48 recorded accident cases happened between 1998-
2008 indicating that poorly conducted process hazard 
analysis/risk assessments were common in these cases [7]. 
An analysis of 400 operational incidents was reported by 
Rashid et al. and concluded that process hazard analysis 
(PHA) has 16% share as a root cause or contributing factor 
in the considered incidents [8]. PHA role in enhancing 
operational discipline is discussed in another study [9]. In 
another work, Rashid et al. has discussed significance of 
PHA, complications in performing PHA and hazardous 
scenarios which needs to be considered for conducting 
PHA [10]. Risk assessment is a method with a broader scope 
which assists in identifying and quantifying the hazards 
and is comprised of various steps [11]. Process hazard 
analysis and safety risk assessment are fundamentally 
different from each other as well as other activities of 
chemical engineering. For better understanding and 
implementation of these aforementioned techniques, 
a combination of art and science principles is highly 
solicited [12]. At present, various techniques, such as, 
Checklist Analysis, What-If-Analysis, What-If/Checklist 
Analysis, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis, 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) have been considered and applied 
for process hazard analysis/ safety risk assessment studies 
[13-15]. 
The techniques discussed above are generically 
classified among two categories namely qualitative 
and quantitative techniques. A detailed information 
regarding the classification of risk assessment techniques 
is available in the literature [16]. Qualitative hazard and 
operability studies have been integrated with risk potential 
matrix and is considered as the most popular method 
being practiced in chemical process industry (CPI). This 
study is based on experience of the experts team with 
various backgrounds, who evaluate the risks associated 
for facilities and activities [12]. There are many reasons 
which render quantitative risk analysis as a preferred 
choice. These include: 1) absence of quality failure rate 
data, 2) inadequate and inappropriate mathematical 
modeling tools to envisage the occurrence of events and 
subsequent consequences in any incident, 3) limitation of 
time for thorough and comprehensive quantification, 4) 
the results in quantitative risk analysis cannot be vouched 
for completeness and reproducibility. Despite of these 
mentioned limitations, a strong qualitative safety/risk 
analysis requires almost the same amount of effort in 
terms of work and time. Table 1 provides the fundamental 
aspects which needs to be considered for a well-structured 
safety/risk analysis.
This article provides an easy qualitative and quanti-
tative risk assessment for practicing engineers. In this 
paper, a methodology for risk assessment based on 
HAZOP integrated with What-If analysis is proposed 
and is named as integrated hazard identification (IHI). 
The methodology is coupled with a case study of urea 
synthesis section of Urea fertilizer plant. It is proposed 
in this work, that PHA experts may assign risk scores for 
risk potential matrix without using risk evaluation matrix, 
relying on their operational experience which may ease 
the job for practicing engineers.
Table 1. Fundamental aspects of safety/risk analysis
No. Fundamental Aspects Methods/ Required Documents
1 Plant & process information for safety/risk analysis
Plant documentation, commercial 
data bases and field experiments 
etc.
2 Hazard identification Past accident analysis, HAZOP and PHA etc.
3 Frequency estimation
Analysis of failure statistics, fault 
tree analysis (FTA) and event tree 
analysis (ETA) etc.
4 Consequence analysis
Disturbance simulation, ETA, 
effect estimation models, damage 
estimation models and Past accident 
analysis (PAA)
5 Risk presentation Risk contours, F-N curves and risk potential matrix
6 Acceptable risk criteria Standards, company and/or state policies
7 Optimization Cost benefit analysis and multi-objective optimization
8 Completeness FMEA, check lists and detailed disturbance simulation
9 Quality Experts & use of computer supported tools
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2. Available Hazard Identification Techniques
Over the years, many techniques have been developed 
for hazard identification. These techniques are largely 
applied for evaluating the safety/risk of chemical 
processes in various stages of process lifecycle. However, 
the future emphasis is on the design of processes plants, 
so these can be inherently safer in nature thus avoiding the 
hazards [17]. In the chemical process industry tools which 
are typically practiced for hazard identification are safety 
reviews, checklists, indices, preliminary hazard analysis, 
what-If analysis, hazard and operability (HAZOP) 
Studies, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), fault 
tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA), cost 
consequence analysis (CCA) and human reliability 
analysis. These techniques are further categorized into 
three groups, as depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Categories of hazard identification techniques
29 CFR 1910.119 OSHA’s regulation requires the 
use of what-If, checklists, HAZOP, FMEA or any other 
appropriate equivalent technique for hazard identification. 
Among these, HAZOP, was developed by imperial 
chemical industries (ICI) in 1963 and is considered as 
the widely accepted technique for hazard identification 
and is being widely used. A HAZOP study follows a 
strict regimen in which deviations of a process from 
its intended design are identified. The procedure is to 
analyze the process and the engineering design for new 
and/or already existing plants in a systematic, skillful 
and strict manner. The intent is to determine the possible 
malfunctioning of individual parts of the equipment and 
subsequently the overall process system. The what-if 
technique, as the name suggests, is based on asking a set 
of successive questions to identify hazards. This method 
is simple and convenient however it is reported to be 
inferior to HAZOP and FTA [14]. The reason is that these 
are well structured methods and operability problems 
and hazards associated with process deviations of design 
intent can be easily identified. However, HAZOP does not 
cover the weaknesses in the process layout and usage of 
wrong construction materials, as well as hazards which 
may occur due to equipment failure [14,18]. Contrary to 
this, what-if technique challenges the design and covers a 
broad range of hazards, such as. electricity, wrong material 
usage, line leakages, tank overflows, contaminations, 
pump seal leakages, moving machinery, pressurized 
fluids, acids usage, hot surfaces and falling materials. 
In order to avoid the limitations, an integrated what-If/
HAZOP technique is proposed in this work. It capitalizes 
on the strengths and compensates individual shortcomings 
of HAZOP and What-If techniques. For instance, cause 
of process parameter deviation is studied in the HAZOP, 
however, it is not included in the typical worksheet of 
what-if analysis. Standard worksheets of what-if, HAZOP 
and proposed integrated what-if/HAZOP technique named 
as integrated hazard identification (IHI) are presented in 
Figure 2. In integrated What-If/HAZOP analysis, both 
causes and risk ranking are studied for what-If raised 
questions or parameter deviations. 
Figure 2. Worksheet for integrated what-If/HAZOP 
analysis
3. Methodology
The important steps of the proposed methodology, 
integrated hazard identification (IHI), used for the risk 
potential assessment of the chemical process industry are 
shown in Figure 3 and are described as under: 
(1) First of all, the process system is identified and 
described such that information regarding the process, its 
operating and design conditions, chemicals and specifically 
hazardous one and its impacts on the environment are 
known. This is typically available at the process plants 
and process safety information (PSI) element of process 
safety management (PSM) ensures that this information is 
made available at all times to all the relevant staff.
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(2) A plant specific numerical rating based on the 
past history of the same plant or similar plants needs 
to be developed by keeping in view the plant specific 
information. However, for presenting this research, 
we have developed the numerical rating both for 
consequences and failure rate by using a fertilizer 
complex data located in Pakistan. These rating values 
with description are available in Table 2. Based on above 
mentioned plant specific scenarios, a numerical rating of 
various consequence classes (C) is provided in Table 2, 
ranging from C-1 to C-4. Here, C1 denotes lowest while 
C-4 is meant for severe consequences. 
Likewise, using the past historical data of that plant, 
failure statistical analysis is conducted using failure 
data of various components. This is demonstrated via 
numerical rating of frequency class ranging from F-1 
to F-4, while the lowest and highest rating is in similar 
fashion to consequence rating and is described in Table 2.
(3) Identification of all possible hazards in the chemical 
process needs to be carried out for a hybrid method, i.e., 
combo of already developed methods namely HAZOP and 
What-If is proposed. For this purpose, the plant is divided 
into sections such that an intensive analysis can be carried 
out via shortcut consequence analysis.
(4) Hazard identification results may be then analyzed 
using the developed risk matrix, where the scenarios are 
ranked to identify the risk potential categories. Ranking 
of these potential categories can lead to recognizing the 
worst-case scenario which is further analyzed in detail.
(5) The risk assessment is carried out for the worst-
case scenario and can be represented using risk contours 
with the aid of ALOHA software. This risk estimation and 
assessment can be helpful to improve designs for process 
plants and developing risk control measures for existing 
process plants. For an existing process plant, the remedial 
actions are decided by the operation staff having required 
expertise to foresee the impacts of these remedial actions 
such that no other problem is caused.
Figure 3. Methodological framework of integrated hazard 
identification (IHI) for quick assessment
Table 2. Numerical rating of different individual risk
Consequence C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4




















Frequency F-1 F-2 F-3 F-4
Category Extremely unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Likely 
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to occur but 
not incredible
Can occur 








-4 10-3 to 10-4 10-2 to 10-3 > 10-2























F-4 IV II I I
F-3 IV III II I
F-2 IV IV III II
F-1 IV IV IV III
C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4
→Increasing Severity 
→Consequence Category
4. Results & Discussion
The Urea synthesis section of a real fertilizer complex 
is considered as a case study for elaborating the proposed 
integrated hazard identification (IHI) methodology. Firstly, 
a brief information regarding the process is provided 
followed by risk assessment results with our method.
4.1 Geographical Location of Plant
The data used in this study are taken from one of the 
largest urea fertilizer manufacturers in Pakistan, which 
is able to produce 500,000 metric tons per annum. The 
plant site is 205 meters above sea level, the climate of 
this area is semi-arid type. Geographically the plant is 
located in extreme climate region. The summer season 
lasts from April to October during which the temperature 
remains between 30 °C and 45 °C. On the other side, 
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the winter season is from November to March and the 
lowest temperature is below 0 °C. The dust storms occur 
occasionally during the hot season, i.e., between June 
and August. Monsoon season alternates with oppressive 
weather. Average wind blows from east to west direction 
with speed of 4 m/s. The average rainfall per year is 500 
mm noted. The mean minimum and maximum humidity 
during winter season stays between 37% and 84%. The 
fertilizer complex facility layout is shown in Figure 4, 
where the urea plant is highlighted and the synthesis 












































Figure 4. Fertilizer facility layout
4.2 Process Description for Urea Production
Overall urea process is divided into six sections named 
as below:
• synthesis
• high pressure decomposition and absorption
• low pressure decomposition and absorption
• recovery
• vacuum concentration
• finishing and prilling
Among these sections, this study has focused on the 
risk assessment of urea synthesis section. A simplified 
process flow diagram of urea synthesis section is provided 
below in Figure 4. The major chemicals involved in this 
section are urea, ammonium carbamate, ammonia and 
carbon dioxide and the associated lines are demonstrated 
in different colors for easy understanding of readers. For 
detail study of urea synthesis section and manufacturing 
process, please read our previous article [19]. 
A detailed investigation has been carried out by 
studying the urea synthesis section logbooks, data 
sheets, safety inspection reports, incident and near miss 
investigation reports for the last 10 years. From this 
investigation, following major operational and safety 
problems have been identified:
• once the plant is shutdown, the atmospheric 
temperature conditions might cause an increase in 
pressure of ammonia feed tank 
• ammonia turbine leakage from oil cup and bearing 
housing 
• frequent ammonia pump mechanical seal leakage 
during both initial startup and normal running operation 
• ammonia counter stop working due to icing on it 
• an abrupt increase in ammonia strainers’ pressure 
drops ΔP 
• ammonia feed pump vapor lock if the speed of the 
pump is reduced
• ammonia feed pump speed indicator control valve 
stuck during operation
• one plunger of ammonia feed pump out of five 
plungers stops moving due to broken cross-head
• frequent leakage of ammonia feed pump plunger 
packing
• ammonium carbamate recycle pump discharge block 
valve opens automatically
• leakage of ammonium carbamate recycle pump 
working barrel
• leakage from ammonium carbamate recycle pump 
discharge ‘O’ rings 
• in ammonium carbamate recycle pump, moisture is 
present in the crankcase oil 
• when ammonium carbamate recycle pump is stopped, 
suction non-return valve (NRV) demonstrated leakage
• rainwater enters into lube oil’s low-pressure switch 
and as a result it is unwillingly actuated 
• leakage in CO2 compressor knock out drum (KOD) 
top patch plate 
• increase in CO2 compressor KOD level 
• CO2 compressor capacity pockets becomes loose 
• CO2 compressor inter-stage cooler tube leakage 
• CO2 compressor stages tempered water circulation 
lost due to pump tripping 
• during the phase of plant shut down, when the urea 
reactor is isolated, malfunctioning of pressure indicator 
with ammonia pump stoppage is observed
• when there is an emergency situation, urea reactors 
are operated occasionally on slightly less load, i.e. lower 
ammonia intake 
• urea reactor gasket and inside coil leakages
• after isolation, urea reactors pressure becomes abruptly 
high
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4.3 Hazards Identification and Risk Potential 
Matrix
The integrated hazard identification (IHI) combining 
HAZOP and What-If is applied to identify the hazards 
and associated risk of urea synthesis section. The process 
is divided into four manageable sections and for each 
section important nodes are identified for performing 
the IHI. Detailed worksheet for conducted IHI of urea 
synthesis section is given in Table 4. For the first scenario, 
in case of excessive mechanical seal leakage of ammonia 
supply pump (P-1 A/B), one possible cause of this leakage 
is the dirty material in the ammonia. Another reason is 
the blockage of flushing line strainers due to oil present in 
the ammonia. On the other side, as a consequence of this 
leakage, there would be an excessive release of ammonia, 
which is harmful for humans working in the surrounding. 
The values assigned to severity and likelihood are entirely 
decided based on the plant historical data, i.e., plant daily 
log sheets, shift reports and down time records of the same 
plant and other similar facilities. Both the severity and 
likelihood are assigned values as C3 and F4 respectively, 
the estimated Risk Ranking (RR) is identified to be I. For 
this issue, in the list of existing protections, we have weir 
at outlet line of T-1 (ammonia feed tank) and draining 
facility of oil from T-1 to avoid strainers blockage. 
Additionally, in mechanical seal flushing line, strainers 
are available and pump isolation can be made to deal 
with emergency situations. Likewise, all deviations for 
the nodes identified for urea synthesis section are studied 
and the summary is provided in Table 4. The associated 
risk is ranked from category I to IV (high to low) and the 
risk ranking for all deviations mentioned in Table 4 are 
shown in Table 5 which is in accordance to the severity 
and likelihood values defined in this work. Risk potential 
matrix for all the identified deviations, i.e., twenty-one in 
count, is prepared and shown in Table 5 and is prepared by 
engaging the criterion already mentioned in Table 3. These 
risk scores values have also been mentioned for each 
deviation in Table 4. Table 5 is the representation of all the 
deviations or hazards available in urea synthesis section 
according to the relevant risk category. Practitioners may 
use it without using any kind of risk evaluation matrix, if 
they have sufficient operational experience. Furthermore, 
the practitioners in any industry may modify the risk 
matrix according to their own requirement or conditions. 
Management and community may also use this risk 
matrix for accessing, evaluating the risks such that they 
may contribute their role in mitigating associated risks 
and hazards. This tool may enhance the management 
judgment and decision making. It may assist operational 
and maintenance staff to take extra precautions for certain 
deviation, in case that identified deviation, highlighted via 
the risk potential matrix, happens. Among the identified 
deviations, a worst-case scenario, namely ammonia pump 
plunger flown away mentioned as serial number 6 in Table 
4, is selected for further studies which is provided in the 
next subsection. A list of incidents and injuries which have 
occurred in urea synthesis section are mentioned in Table 
6 just for sharing the experience with fellow researchers 
and practitioners.
4.4 Detailed Analysis and Accident Quantification
The incident of ammonia pump, one out of five plunger 
release has happened in XYZ fertilizer during plant 
installation. This issue is considered as the worst-case 
scenario as in this case, ammonia had been released in 
enormous amount. To study the outcome of severeness 
by leakage of excessive amount of ammonia, the scenario 
was modeled by using ALOHA (Areal Locations of 
Hazardous Atmospheres) software, as it is easily available 
software and can be widely used by practitioners for 
quick detailed assessment. The modelling details are 
as mentioned; gaussian model for dispersion, which 
occurs in air. The quantity of ammonia released was 
150 gpm and the release is pertained for 10 minutes. 
Building air exchanges per hour was considered as 0.95, 
for unsheltered single storied, and wind speed of 4 m/
s from east to west direction with 50% relative humidity 
was applied based on the studied plant information. 
No inversion height was considered for this model, 
source and fixed air temperatures were 38 °C and 41 
°C respectively. When the simulation was run, ALOHA 
displayed a threat zone plot, which showed one or more 
areas where toxicity may exceed the Levels of Concern 
(LOCs) and can be translated as a threat to all entities 
namely environment, people and property. Three LOCs 
have been considered, and ALOHA is able to display all 
three threat zones, highlighted by red, orange and yellow 
colors. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) were 
engaged to represent three zones in red, orange and yellow 
colors, respectively and named as AEGL-3, AEGL-2 and 
AEGL-1. These exposures are considered for 60 minutes 
duration. The threat zone indicated by ALOHA for above-
mentioned worst-case scenario of plunger removal is 
depicted in Figure 5.
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Table 4. Integrated hazard identification (IHI) of urea synthesis section
Plant:               XYZ               
Equipment:    ABC          
Process:  Urea synthesis section  
Function: Transfer of ammonia, carbon dioxide and recycle 
ammonium carbamate to urea reactors    
Operating conditions: Topt = 283 °F, Popt = 3200 psig
Document:     













- Weir at outlet line 
T-1
- Draining of oil from 
T-1
- Fire water available 
- Strainer in flushing 
water line
- Pump isolation is 
possible
- Dirty material in 
ammonia
- Flushing line 
strainers blockage due 
to oil
Excessive ammonia 
leakage may cause fatal 
human injury
I
- Before starting clean strainer
- Weir inspection after two 
years
- Oil removal system at inlet 
line of T-1
- Before starting P-1 give 
settling time in T-1









- T-2, level will 
decrease
- P-2AB may vapor 
lock
Standby pump is present IV
Breaker/motor schedule 






not increase on 
starting
- Pump impeller 
damage
- Suction valve close 
or partially open
- Suction strainer 
choke
- Pump vapor lock
Level of tank will 
disturb
- Standby pump is present
- Priming line available IV None
4 T-1 High temperature
- Ammonia stays in 
tank for long time
- P-1AB on close 




Provision of fresh 
ammonia from TK-601 & 
ammonia plant side
IV Provide a pipeline from T-1 to TK-601




- P-1AB on close 
circulation for long 
time
-Leakage may start at 
any point
-Restrict the ammonia 
inlet flow










Broken bolts of 
plunger yoke
NH3 leakage due to 
plunger may flown 
away can cause human 
injuries like
- Eyes & skin irritation
- Chemical burn
- Breathing difficulties 
like suffocation
- Daily preventive 
maintenance 
- Two hourly basis 
operator readings 




- MSDS available in C/R
- Supplied air masks 
I Schedule maintenance is essential





-Packing water is not 
on 
NH3   leakage can 
cause
human injuries like
- Eyes & skin irritation
- Frost bites
- Breathing difficulties 
like suffocation  
- Tripping from control 
room
- PPEs
- MSDS available in C/R
- Extra safety equipment 
like acid proof suit in C/R
IV
- Keep pumps packing water 
on if pump is primed




from notch nut PSV seat leakage
NH3   leakage can 
cause human injuries 
like
- Eyes & skin irritation
- Frost bites
- Breathing difficulties 
like suffocation
- Tripping from control 
room
- PPEs
- MSDS available in C/R
- Extra safety equipment 
like acid proof suit in C/R
II
- Annually calibrate the PSVs 
- Replace PSV if and when 
seat leakage of PSV detected
34





Pitting of welding 
joints
- NH3 leakage can 
cause human injuries 
like
- Eyes & skin irritation
- Frost bites
- Breathing difficulties 
like suffocation




- MSDS available in C/R
- Extra safety equipment 
like acid proof suit in C/R
III Annually ultrasonic flaw test of welding joints is required




NH3 due to tube 
leakage can cause 
human
- Breathing difficulties 
like suffocation
- Pollution
- Supplied air masks 
- MSDS available in C/R II
Automatic closing of TIC-





- Hot spot formation
- Corrosion
Conversion in reactor 
will decrease
Temperature control on 
carbamate heaters IV
Reactor coil to be inspected in 
shut down
12 P-5 ABC Pump tripped PSLL (Lube oil low low pressure)
- Shaft driven pump 
not making proper 
pressure due to low 
speed of pump and 
auxiliary not start b/c 
its switch was not on 
auto
- Oil filter choked
- Less crankcase oil 
level
- Working barrel of 
pump leak
- Short circuiting of 
PSLL switch due to 
rainwater intake
- Two hourly basis 
operator readings
- Daily preventive 
maintenance of pump





while its motor 
is running
Instrument air failure
- E-3 level will 
increase
- Reactors temperature 
will increase
Spare pump available IV None
14 E-4 A/B Tube leaks
Erosion 
Corrosion due to 
high concentration of 
Carbamate
- E-3 level increases
- Carbamate pumps 
speed increases
- Carbamate 
temperature (E-5 A/B) 
increases







- Inspection of tubes should 
be done in T/A
- Detailed study should 
be carried out due to tube 
leakage
15 C-1A/B 1st K.O.D. level increases 
Auto drainers not 
working
- Moisture carries over 
to stage
- Mechanical damage
- LSH (level switch high)
- LSHH (level switch high) 






CO2  suction 
line very low 
pressure
Ammonia unit carbon 
dioxide absorber 
problem 





After ammonia unit 









line PSHH not 
operated
Instrument fault Can damage discharge line
- PSV





Instrument air failure 
- CO2 flow to RX A/B 
decrease RX A/B 
- E-3 level decreases 
temperature decreases
Isolating valve IV None
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20 C-1A/B




- Loss of lubrication
- Loss of C.W.
- Packing damaged
- CO2 flow to RX A/B 
decrease
- RX A/B temperature 
decreases
- Production loss.
Plant water provision is 
also provided II
Packing should be inspected 










Less circulation of 
tempered water
PSL @35# will start the 
stand-by pump IV
- Provide low pressure alarm 
at DCS 
- Schedule checking of auto-
start switch
















C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4
Increasing Severity
Table 6. Incidents and injuries
Incidents and Injuries
No. Accident Injuries Down Time Remedial Action
1
Operator was opening the reactor main 
drain valve when its handle broke and key 
strike with head  
Operator got wound on his 
head -----------
Valves were replaced and preventive schedule 
for replacement was made
2
Operator rises on compressor 
crankcase to open cooler valve and fell 
down  
Operator nose bone was 
fractured ----------- A stand was provided for operation of valve 
4 Ammonia feed pump discharge pressure transmitter rubber tubing was detached  
Area operator was affected 
due to ammonia (vomiting)  
6 hours plant shut 
down 
Rubber tubing was replaced with permanent 
mild steel line 
5 Urea reactor main angle valve gland leak heavily  
cause area operators nose 
swelling and vomiting
5 hours plant shut 
down
Preventive maintenance schedule was made 
for main angle valve replacement 
6 Ammonium carbamate recycle pump discharge bottle was leaked 
Area operators nose and lips 
swelling
8 hours plant shut 
down
Ultrasonic non-destructive testing (NDT) to 
check discharge bottles material started on 
regular intervals  
7
Ammonia pump mechanical seal leak 
excessively and made difficult to start 
stand by pump due to ammonia  
Made area operator 
unconscious
3 hours plant shut 
down
Clean mechanical seal strainers before starting 
the pump. Also oil is drained from Ammonia 
feed tank
8 Engineer fell from oil on floor Shoulder joint was dislocated ----------- Preventive maintenance of pumps scheduled to remove oil leakages 
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Figure 5. ALOHA footprints for worst-case scenario
From Figure 5, the highly threat zone indicated via red 
line stays up to 403 meters from the source of ammonia 
release. After this distance, the amount dispersed in the 
air falls below the AEGL-3 range and is the medium level 
of threat. This medium area of threat is displayed via 
orange line and may exist up to 1245 meters from source 
of release. The last region which is considered as the 
region with the lowest possible threat and is indicated as 
yellow zone and stays up to 2.3 miles. After this distance, 
the amount of ammonia available in the air has negligible 
threats. Next, threat at a point (inside and outside control 
room), 20 meters west and 5 meters north direction was 
estimated by using ALOHA modeling and the relevant 
output is presented in the Figure 6.
Figure 6. ALOHA footprints for threat at a point
It is clearly indicated by the Figure 6 that control room 
indoor concentration would reach 384 ppm while outdoor 
would be 2630 ppm compared to 1100 ppm (AEGL-3) [20], 
which demonstrates clearly that ammonia concentrations 
would increase instantaneously if pump is not stopped 
and isolated immediately. This abrupt increment in 
ammonia concentration would lead to many health and 
process related issues and might lead to some catastrophic 
scenario.
5. Conclusions
For risk assessment, hazard identification is the first and 
most crucial step. For this task, many methods have been 
in practice and many classifications of these techniques 
are available such as qualitative and quantitative, and 
shortcut techniques, standard techniques and advanced 
techniques. Among the practicing techniques, HAZOP 
and What-if are mostly practiced. And standard templates 
of both are available. Studying and comparing of 
these methods have revealed that what-If technique 
challenges the design basis, on the other hand HAZOP 
challenges the operating parameters consideration. 
Furthermore, HAZOP is structured however it is unable 
to accommodate most of the scenarios. Contrary to this, 
What-if is able to cover a broad range of scenarios, 
however, it is not a structured method. In this context, 
a hazard identification method, IHI, which can cover a 
broad range of scenarios and is structured in nature, seems 
necessitated. For this purpose, a new technique namely 
integrated hazard identification (IHI) is proposed in this 
work. The proposed technique provides detailed analysis 
of a facility than any of two mentioned techniques. In 
this integrated technique, a handy risk potential matrix is 
also developed and is presented for the considered case 
study of urea synthesis section of a real fertilizer complex. 
The risk potential matrix is based on risk evaluation by 
combing consequences and frequency. For this purpose, 
consequence class C1-C4 and frequency class F1-F4 have 
been defined. Risk ranking/risk score was assigned from 
I to IV translated as highest to lowest risk respectively. 
Consequence and frequency values are merely based on 
historical data of plant, e.g., daily log sheets, shift reports 
and down time records of the same plant and other similar 
facilities. Incidents and injuries occurred during the last 
10 years were enlisted followed by studying all possible 
scenarios with proposed methodology. By using ALOHA 
footprints, a major accident of ammonia pump plunger 
flown away was studied and quantified in detail. ALOHA 
indicated that inside and outside the control room, 
concentrations of ammonia would be 384 ppm and 2630 
ppm, compared to 1100 (AEGL-3). This article attempts 
to signifies the importance of rapidity in emergency 
handling and response of similar scenarios. 
Recommendations
This research is important if a major ammonia leakage 
occur from industry pumps or elsewhere how safe will be 
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nearby occupants, nearby villages, cities or even control 
room located inside the industry. Integrated Hazard 
Identification technique is very easy for practitioners as 
it will overcome hazardous situations and will prevent 
small or major hazards which may lead to a catastrophic 
event. These results can be used to calculate ammonia 
concentrations in nearby area and for emergency escape 
or vacating the area. All available hazard identification 
techniques are categorized. Fundamental aspects of risk 
and hazard are provided. IHI technique is graphically 
depicted. Methodological framework for quick risk 
assessment is provided. Fertilizer facility layout is 
provided to identify location of the specific industry units 
e.g. Urea unit is red highlighted. Urea synthesis section 
colorful diagram is provided to identify different streams 
such as ammonia, CO2, Ammonium carbamate. This 
research also indirectly highlights that Urea formation 
from CO2 is a better option for Carbon Capture Storage 
and Utilization (CCS). Different occurred incidents in 
last ten years are shown hence that other industries all 
over the world can safeguard their self. Detailed IHI of 
Urea synthesis section is provided. Risk potential matrix 
is shown with scores in different colors. Major occurred 
incidents and injuries are shown in a table. Accident 
quantification and detailed ALOHA footprints indicating 
AEGL-3, AEGL-2, AEGL-1 are shown. Threat at different 
points is shown and future recommendations are provided.
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